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Abstract 
The theory of career mobility (Sicherman and Galor 1990) claims that wage penalties for 
overeducated workers are compensated by better promotion prospects. Sicherman (1991) 
was able to confirm this theory in an empirical study. However, the controls for the opposing 
phenomenon of undereducation used in his tests produced unconvincing results, for which no 
sound theoretical explanations were given. The only re-test yet conducted (Robst 1995) also 
produced ambiguous results. In the present paper, we estimate random effects models to 
analyze relative wage growth using data from the German Socio-Economic Panel. We find 
that overeducated workers have markedly lower relative wage growth rates than correctly 
allocated workers, while undereducated workers enjoy higher rates of relative wage growth. 
Our results cast serious doubt on the career mobility model, at least with respect to the 
overeducation issue. In view of the acknowledged positive correlation between access to 
training and upward career mobility, the plausibility of our results is supported by the finding 
that overeducated workers have less access to formal and informal on-the-job training, while 
undereducated workers are more likely to be admitted to such programs. 
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Overeducation, Undereducation, and the Theory of Career Mobility  
 
1  Introduction  
A central feature of the theory of career mobility established by Sicherman and Galor 
(1990) is that "part of the returns to education is in the form of higher probabilities of 
occupational upgrading, within or across firms." As a consequence, "individuals may 
choose an entry level in which the direct returns to schooling are lower than those in 
other feasible entry levels if the effect of schooling on the probability of promotion is 
higher in this firm."1 If this were the case, the theory of career mobility would 
provide a powerful tool for research in overeducation – the phenomenon of a 
worker’s actual level of qualification exceeding the requirements of his or her job 
(see, e.g., Duncan and Hoffmann 1981). Sicherman’s (1991) own empirical tests 
indeed confirmed the expectation that overeducated workers have better upward 
career mobility prospects than correctly allocated ones.  
As within the career mobility model, overeducation can be regarded as a 
short-term mismatch occurring at the beginning of a working career. In principle, this 
would be consistent with almost all empirical findings from various countries, 
showing that work experience and tenure are negatively correlated with the 
probability of working in a position for which one is overeducated (see, e.g., Duncan 
and Hoffmann 1981, Sicherman 1991, Alba-Ramirez 1993, Groot 1996, Kiker et al. 
1997, Sloane et al. 1999, Daly et al. 2000). Most authors who perceive their 
empirical results as being in line with the central findings of Sicherman’s study 
assume the validity of this rather simple construct of the cross-sectional relationship 
between experience, tenure, and the match between formal qualification and skill 
requirements (see, e.g., Alba-Ramirez 1993, Groot 1993, Groot 1996, Sloane et al. 
1996).  
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However, the only empirical evidence based on panel data – Sicherman 
(1991) and Robst (1995) – leaves some questions unanswered. First of all, results 
seem to be sensitive to the specification and measurement of upward wage mobility. 
In this respect, it is rather surprising that the career mobility model, based as it is on 
upward wage mobility, has only been tested using measures of occupational mobility 
or changes in the level of education required for individuals to perform their jobs 
across time. In particular, the original occupational measure used by Sicherman 
(1991) could be problematic, as moving to a better occupation does not necessarily 
indicate a move to a better job. Second, much of the empirical overeducation 
literature shows that overeducated workers are generally under-performers with 
respect to their occupational success up to the date of observation (see, e.g., Tsang 
and Levin 1985, Tsang et al. 1991, Dolton and Vignoles 1997 and 2000, Mendes de 
Oliveira et al 2000, Büchel 2001). As such, the idea that overeducated workers 
should suddenly become out-performers is counter-intuitive. The empirical evidence 
on this point is also rather ambiguous. On the one hand, Sicherman (1991) and Robst 
(1995) report that overeducated workers experience more upward occupational 
mobility and more switches to jobs requiring more training, respectively. On the 
other hand, Robst (1995) shows that “(…) contrary to the career mobility hypothesis, 
overeducated workers are not more likely than adequately educated workers to feel 
their current job provides training which will lead to a better job.” (p. 549).   
In the light of the fact that the Sicherman (1991) article is now one of the 
most frequently cited papers in the field of overeducation research, we believe that 
this rather unsatisfactory pattern of results needs urgent clarification. We therefore 
retest the career mobility hypothesis on the basis of wage mobility. This is consistent 
with the career model in which workers temporarily enter jobs for which they are 
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overeducated in order to obtain the training needed to move on to better, and 
especially higher-paying, positions. 
The paper is structured as follows. First, we discuss the empirical literature on 
overeducation and its compatibility with the career mobility hypothesis in more 
detail (Section 2). After presenting data and methods in Section 3, we conduct a 
thorough re-examination of the results obtained by Sicherman (1991) in Section 4.1. 
Although we are able to replicate his results with a German dataset, the German 
Socio-economic Panel, we show that the base effects of upward career mobility have 
to be modelled carefully to prevent biased estimates. This is followed in Section 4.2 
by our major analysis of upward wage mobility. Contrary to the predictions of the 
career mobility model, we find less upward wage mobility for overeducated workers 
than for correctly allocated ones, while undereducated workers experience more 
upward wage mobility. This result holds irrespective of whether the analysis is based 
on year-to-year changes or five-year mobility. In Section 4.3, we extend Robst’s 
(1995) test for robustness by using an objective, as well as a subjective, measure of 
training participation. Both measures confirm Robst’s findings that overeducated 
(undereducated) workers indeed receive less (more) training than correctly allocated 
ones. This finding is consistent with the results gained from our main wage mobility 
analysis. Finally, in Section 5 we summarize our findings and draw some 
conclusions. 
 
2  Background  
In contrast to all competing theories aiming to explain the persistence of high levels 
of overeducation in the industrialized countries (e.g., human capital theory, job 
search theory, assignment theory2), the theory of career mobility considers both the 
supply and the demand side of the labour market. In this theory overeducation is at 
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times a rational choice for both sides, employees and employers. Understandably, 
then, overeducation researchers tend to find the career mobility theory put forward 
by Sicherman (1991) rather attractive. The career mobility model and the empirical 
test of the model conducted by Sicherman himself have thus had a profound 
influence on subsequent overeducation research.  
However, the theory of career mobility does not provide a completely 
satisfactory explanation for qualification mismatch in the labour market, as it offers 
no possible explanation for the opposing and equally observable phenomenon of 
“undereducation.” Nevertheless, Sicherman (1991) enters an undereducation dummy 
in his models when testing the overeducation hypotheses of the Sicherman and Galor 
theory. His empirical results show the same significant and positive effect on the 
probability of promotion for both overeducated and undereducated workers 
(Sicherman 1991, Table 3, column (c)). Sicherman is himself surprised by this result: 
“Since the theory of career mobility makes predictions only with respect to 
overeducated workers, I do not discuss the relations between undereducation and 
career mobility. So far I do not have a good explanation for this result.” (p. 109f.). 
We are less puzzled by this result than Sicherman. Undereducated workers are 
generally expected to have above-average abilities (Hartog 2000); compared to the 
expectations linked to their (relatively low) educational attainments, their career 
performance up to the point at which the qualification mismatch is observed is 
atypically successful. Why shouldn’t these workers continue to be atypically 
successful in their future careers?  
We are more perturbed by the predictions of the career mobility theory – i.e., 
that overeducated workers have above-average career prospects. Why should the 
overeducated, whose previous career paths provide explicit confirmation of the fact 
that they have been unable to secure a job corresponding to their formal 
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qualifications, display different behaviour in the future? While we do not dispute that 
the career mobility model may be able explain some aspects of overeducation, the 
empirical literature suggests that the career trajectories of overeducated workers in 
fact take a different course to that predicted by the model. 
First of all, previous overeducation research has found that the wage profiles 
of overeducated, but non-academic, new entrants to the German labour market are 
flatter in the first career period than those of their correctly allocated counterparts 
(Büchel 1994). The same was observed for all workers in both East and West 
Germany after reunification (Büchel 2001). Corresponding findings from other 
countries are rare, because there is still a lack of longitudinal overeducation research 
(exceptions being Groot 1996, Dolton and Vignoles 1997). However, Dolton and 
Vignoles (1997, 2000) and Mendes de Oliveira et al. (2000) have shown that a 
substantial proportion of the overeducated workforce fails to secure a better job over 
a longer period of several years. Similar findings have been presented by Battu et al. 
(1999). All this suggests that careers tend to follow the path laid at labour-market 
entry, and that overeducated workers do not succeed in achieving extraordinary 
upward career moves. 
Furthermore, several studies have shown that overeducated workers are less 
productive than correctly allocated workers with the same formal qualifications (see, 
e.g., Tsang and Levin 1985, Tsang et al. 1991, Büchel 2001)3. Whereas the standard 
approaches in this field usually focus on job satisfaction, health status, absenteeism, 
firm tenure, and participation in on-the-job-training, the study by Büchel (2001) 
examined working conditions and behaviour in much more detailed form (with about 
50 items). Büchel found indications that overeducated workers are less productive in 
almost all items. When asked: “Are you willing to work overtime without extra 
payment?”, overeducated workers were much more likely to give negative answers 
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than correctly allocated ones. This certainly indicates lower job satisfaction. 
Moreover, their low levels of on-the-job training mean that overeducated workers are 
the last to be considered likely candidates for upward mobility by personnel 
researchers. Of course, one could argue that a lack of satisfaction in a specific job is 
an important push factor encouraging workers to change firms. The “experience 
good” variant of the job matching theory (Jovanovic 1979a, 1979b) does indeed 
predict that the match between educational attainment and qualification requirement 
will improve over the course of the career. However, recent analyses based on 
German data have shown that the probability of overeducation increases significantly 
with the number of previous job changes (Büchel 1998, p. 139). This finding lends 
support to a labour segmentation approach (Taubman and Wachter, 1986) rather than 
the job matching theory as an explanation of overeducation. In addition, it is well 
known that future career opportunities are strongly determined by occupational 
behaviour in previous jobs; references from former employers would otherwise be 
pointless. State-dependency could thus also be an important factor in explaining 
overeducation. 
In sum, the empirical literature to date is largely at odds with the career 
mobility theory and with Sicherman’s (1991) findings that overeducated workers 
experience higher upward occupational mobility. In the following sections, we try to 
cast some light on the discussion by re-estimating Sicherman’s model and examining 
the wage changes of overeducated and undereducated workers in comparison with 
their correctly allocated counterparts.   
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3. Data and Methods 
3.1 Database and Case Selection 
Our empirical analysis is based on representative longitudinal data from the German 
Socio-economic Panel (GSOEP), conducted by the German Institute for Economic 
Research (DIW) in Berlin. This ongoing survey was initiated in 1984, when more 
than 12,000 individuals aged 16 or above were interviewed. Additional information 
on these individuals is collected annually with a questionnaire that remains largely 
constant. The main purpose of the survey is to obtain longitudinal data on 
educational and labour market behaviour in particular (for more details see 
Projektgruppe Panel 1995).  
In the present study, we use the West German sub-sample from 1984 to 1997. 
We analyse the year-to-year career mobility of men in full-time employment in 
various forms. In addition, we extend the approach by considering a five-year 
observation period. Both analyses require valid information on the variables used to 
construct the respective mobility measure in each of the years under analysis. In 
addition, valid information about the covariates in the base year is required.4 As we 
also run panel random effect models, those respondents for whom only one pair of 
income data is available are also excluded. The self-employed, trainees, and civil 
servants are not included in our sample. To allow for the possibility of upward 
mobility among all respondents, we exclude those who have already reached the 
maximum level of the respective position measure in the base year.5 
 
3.2 Measuring Over- and Undereducation 
A subjective approach is used to identify over- and undereducation. The GSOEP 
contains yearly information about the formal education of jobholders as well as data 
on the formal qualifications typically needed to perform their current job. A 
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comparison of these two variables is usually used to generate the mismatch variable. 
However, we go one step further and check the plausibility of this mismatch variable 
by reference to additional information about the blue- or white-collar status of the 
jobholders. Using this three-variable approach instead of the traditional two-variable 
one has advantages and disadvantages (for details see Büchel, 2001). The major 
advantage is that the categorization becomes more precise and the validity of the 
discrimination between the groups is improved. Following this procedure, two new 
categories are introduced: implausible combinations of the three variables (< 1%), 
and a category of cases that cannot be conclusively classified as either mismatch or 
correct allocation (about 5%). Both of these categories are excluded from our 
analyses. One minor disadvantage that arises in the three-variable approach is the 
slightly higher risk of missing values in the mismatch variable. This is not a serious 
problem, however, because there are almost no missing values for blue- and white-
collar status in the GSOEP. Our categorization procedure is documented in Appendix 
Table A1. 
 
4 Empirical Results 
4.1 Replication and Extension of Sicherman’s Approach 
We follow Sicherman (1991) as closely as possible and use a two-digit coding of 
occupational groups. This means that a change in the occupation will only be 
observed when there is an apparent change in the tasks performed. Like Sicherman, 
we only analyse upward moves. Clearly, this approach requires a ranking of 
occupational groups. The ranking procedure is based on the mean levels of human 
capital needed to work in the different occupations. These levels are constructed by 
first estimating OLS wage regressions including the usual controls for schooling and 
experience for individual i at time t: 
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(1)  ln (wit)= α0 educit + α1 experienceit + α2 experienceit2 + α3 required trainingit + β'xit+ ε 
 
where xit are covariates other than human capital variables. As the GSOEP does not 
collect information on the ‘required training’ variable in the form of years, we have 
to start by estimating this value using data on the years of education acquired by all 
workers who are correctly allocated, i.e., neither overeducated nor undereducated. 
The mean level of schooling within the 69 relatively small occupational groups is 
defined to be the training required to perform the occupation6. We then use the 
parameter estimates for α0, α1, α2, and α3 (a0, a1, a2, and a3) to estimate the human 
capital needed to perform the occupation for each individual i: 
 
(2) HCit =  a0 educationit + a1 experienceit + a2 experience2it + a3 required trainingit. 
 
The mean level for each of the 69 occupational groups is then calculated and 
used to rank the occupation. This procedure provides us with the necessary ranking 
of occupations.7 Though not completely identical, there is a close resemblance 
between our ranking and the one drawn up by Sicherman (see Sicherman 1991, 
Appendix A, pp. 188f.). The descriptive analysis in the first panel of Table 1 shows 
that both undereducated and overeducated workers are more likely to move to 
occupations with higher human capital requirements than the reference group of 
correctly allocated workers.  
 
---- Please insert Table 1 about here ----- 
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This finding is consistent with the multivariate results produced by Sicherman 
(1991), reported in the first column of Table 2: the coefficients for both 
overeducation and undereducation are positive and significant. This implies that 
respondents in these two groups are more likely than those in the reference group to 
move to higher-level occupations, with the effect for the undereducated being 
somewhat higher. 
 
---- Please insert Table 2 about here ----- 
 
In order to test whether overeducated workers are more likely to move to 
higher-ranked occupations in Germany, we now go on to estimate random-effects 
probit models of the following form: 
 
(3) tiititititti uxunderovermove ,,,2,1),1(, ' εβγγα +++++=+  
 
where the dummy variable movei,(t+1,t) indicates whether person i moved to an 
occupation requiring more human capital between t and t+1. The dependent variable 
equals 1 if the worker has moved to a higher-ranked occupation since the previous 
data collection. Because the highest occupational group cannot achieve further 
upward mobility, it is excluded from the analyses. The variable overi,t is a dummy 
indicating overeducation in the base period; underi,t indicates undereducation; xi,t is a 
set of additional exogenous variables also measured in the base period; ui is the 
random disturbance characterizing the ith observation, which is fixed over time; and 
εi,t a white noise error. We introduce random effects to control for individual 
heterogeneity, i.e., the problem that individuals might not only differ in their 
observed characteristics, but also in unobserved characteristics over time. Exogenous 
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variables are those generally known to influence the career-mobility process, such as 
schooling or experience in the base year.  
Replicating Sicherman’s multivariate model (Table 2, column I) as closely as 
possible with our German data, we obtain the same pattern of results for the two 
dummy variables, as shown in Table 2, column II.8 We first use a binary logit model, 
in the same way as Sicherman (column II), and then run a more sophisticated 
random-effects probit model (column III). At first glance, the results of the 
overeducation dummy seem to correspond to Sicherman’s theory, which assumes 
that overeducated workers are simply at the beginning of their career, and that their 
career paths thus intersect with others who have less education and therefore fewer 
opportunities for upward mobility. 
The findings for undereducated workers are difficult to reconcile with those 
for overeducated workers. While Sicherman (1991, p. 110) has “no good explanation 
for this result,” the findings do correspond with our expectations. While 
undereducated workers will be given the opportunity for on-the-job training, 
overeducated workers will have problems in finding better jobs due to the negative 
signalling effects of their current position or even the depreciation of their human 
capital. This explanation does not tally with the effects found for overeducated 
workers, however. We believe that this mixed result is directly related to the 
measurement of upward career mobility. Before turning to this point in more detail, 
we demonstrate the effects of including other variables that we consider to be 
important in a model of career mobility.  
A major conclusion of the career mobility theory proposed by Sicherman and 
Galor (1990) is that firm tenure impacts on the probability of moving between or 
within firms. It is thus rather strange that Sicherman did not control for this strategic 
variable in his own model. Similarly, firm size and industry are known to affect 
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career opportunities. The respective dummy variables for Germany were therefore 
included in Table 2, column IV, with no notable effects on the over- and 
undereducation results.  
However, another, even more important influence also has to be taken into 
consideration. A closer examination of the occupations reveals that mobility between 
some of the groups is almost impossible. In the highest groups primarily occupied by 
academics (2-8), only about 2% of respondents realized upward moves,9 with most 
of these moves being made into the very broad category including architects, 
chemists, engineers, physical and biological scientists, and mathematicians. Moving 
down the ladder of occupations, upward moves become increasingly plausible: 
nearly 10% of respondents in the lowest groups (25-27) accomplished upward 
moves. This phenomenon also has to be taken into account in the analyses; we thus 
propose to include controls for the starting position in the occupational hierarchy. In 
order to control for this “base effect,” we form five groups and include four dummy 
variables in the third specification for Germany (Table 2, Model V).10 All of these 
dummies have negative signs and are highly significant: As expected, workers in 
higher occupational groups are less likely to move upward than workers in the lowest 
occupations. Once these base effects have been included, overeducation becomes 
insignificant, showing that the base effect indeed explains much of the variance 
otherwise picked up by the overeducation variable, since overeducation is most 
likely in jobs with low skill requirements.11 Moreover, the schooling coefficient – 
which was negative in Sicherman’s analysis and was insignificant for Germany in 
the first three specifications – now becomes positive, as was initially expected. In 
other words, controlling for the base effects leads to more plausible results in terms 
of the theory formulated by Sicherman and Galor: Education has a positive influence 
 13
 
on the probability of being promoted. In the following sections, we explore whether 
the results hold when other measures of upward career mobility are applied.  
 
4.2 Results of the Upward Wage Mobility Approach 
In response to these results, we propose an alternative, improved measure of career 
mobility. Such a measure is provided by Sicherman and Galor’s model itself, which 
is based on the proposition that upward career mobility is associated with wage 
increases. In the following, we thus look directly at wage increases.  
In the GSOEP, workers report gross monthly wages for their current job on a 
yearly basis. We use this information to construct two measures of upward wage 
mobility as an indicator for an upward career move. To allow for the possibility of 
upward mobility among all individuals in our sample, the highest earners with gross 
monthly earnings of above DM 10,000 in the base year were excluded from the 
analyses. In our first specification (equation 4) workers (i) are defined to experience 
upward career mobility if their wage growth from year t to t+1 (or to t+5 
respectively) is higher than the mean wage growth during that period plus one 
standard deviation in their status group (g) in the pair of years under investigation 
(y)12: 
 
(4)  ∆ ln (wi,y) > mean (∆ ln (wg,y)) + std (∆ ln (wg,y)). 
 
This approach was chosen to allow for career moves in the sense of 
Sicherman and Galor to be identified. In our second specification, we take a 
continuous, rather than binary, dependent variable. We estimate wage growth 
regressions using the same set of covariates (xit) as in the previous analyses, but now 
using GLS with random effects: 
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(5) tiititititixti uxunderoverww ,,,2,1,, lnln εβγγα +++++=−+ ; x = 1; 5. 
 
Wage growth regressions similar to this have frequently been used to study, for 
example, the effects of job mobility and reasons for job change on wages (see, e.g., 
Bartel and Borjas 1981, Addison and Portugal 1989, Ruhm 1987, Neal 1995, and 
Burda and Mertens 2001). We estimate two different specifications, the first 
analysing wage changes from the year of observation t to the subsequent year t+1, 
and the second analysing changes from year t to t+5. Note that covariates are always 
measured in the base period t.  
The descriptive statistics of the wage change analysis are reported in the 
second panel of Table 1 above. Whereas the descriptive results are very similar to 
those found in the replication of Sicherman’s occupational upward mobility approach 
(first panel in Table 1), the results produced by the models in Table 3 are rather 
different from those presented in Table 2. Based on the results of the previous 
analyses, we include the base income in our model, thus controlling for the important 
effect that people starting from a lower level always have better opportunities for 
career advancement. 
 
---- Please insert Table 3 about here ---- 
 
No matter which specification we use, the signs of the coefficients for the 
overeducation variables turn from plus to minus (Table 3). Note that we now control 
for the base effect. Overeducated workers are less likely to experience above-average 
relative wage increases than correctly allocated workers; undereducated workers are 
more likely to experience such increases. Even if we believed that overeducated 
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workers are more likely to move up or between occupations, what matters most is 
whether their wages increase accordingly. There is no doubt at all that a valid 
indicator for upward career mobility should display a high positive correlation with 
relative wage growth. If overeducated workers are expected to have better career 
opportunities than correctly allocated workers, higher rates of wage growth should 
also be observed among this group. This does not seem to be the case, however. The 
structure of results holds when switching form a one-year to a five-year observation 
period (Table 4). 
 
---- Please insert Table 4 about here ---- 
 
The results presented in this section suggest that Sicherman’s (1991) 
empirical test is not an appropriate test for his theory. This casts serious doubt on 
Sicherman and Galor’s (1990) hypothesis that overeducation is associated with better 
career prospects.  
These results correspond to other findings from overeducation research, as 
outlined in the Section 2. Overeducation can, for example, be explained by simple 
structural discrepancies in the relative supply and demand of qualified workers: An 
oversupply in highly qualified workers might result in overeducated workers being 
stuck in lower-level jobs due to the depreciation of their human capital, de-
motivation, or negative signalling (Spence 1973), for example. Undereducated 
workers, on the other hand, might benefit from the fact that some firms are looking 
for qualified workers but are not able to hire workers with the appropriate level of 
education. Another explanation can be found in human capital theory, and has also 
been proposed by Sicherman (1991). When human capital differs in measurable (on-
the-job training, experience) as well as non-measurable (ability) components, it will 
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always be possible to find workers who are not allocated according to their 
measurable educational attainment. In the following and final section, we test 
whether subjective and objective information about on-the-job training provides 
support for our results and interpretations. 
 
4.3  Testing for Robustness: Access to On-the-Job Training 
Finally, we test the results obtained in the previous step for robustness, analysing on-
the-job training activities for under- and overeducated workers. This is done using 
two indicators, a subjective and an objective one. First, we use the respondents’ 
answers to the question: “Do you feel that, when doing your job, you are always 
learning things that could lead to a better job or promotion?” (response alternatives: 
“absolutely correct,” “partly correct,” “not correct”). This question was posed in the 
GSOEP in the years 1985, 1987, 1989, and 1997. Robst (1995) used the same 
question and concluded for the United States that, contrary to the career mobility 
hypothesis, overeducated workers are no more likely to acquire knowledge that could 
lead to a better job. Second, we use information gathered in the years 1989 and 1993 
on whether GSOEP respondents had participated in a job-related training measure 
lasting more than one day in the preceding three-year period (“yes” or “no”).  
It could be the case that firms hire undereducated workers when they are not 
able to find better qualified workers, and that overeducated workers take these jobs 
because there are simply not enough positions available for people of their 
qualification level. In this case, we can expect to find that overeducated workers are 
less likely to learn things that could further their career advancement, or to receive 
formal on-the-job training. The GSOEP contains information on both variables. 
Table 5 presents some basic descriptives. 
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---- Please insert Table 5 about here ---- 
 
In Table 5, we find very strong correlations between formal and informal 
training on the one hand and mismatch status on the other. Overeducated workers 
have far fewer opportunities to learn things that they consider to be useful for their 
future career,13 and have far less access to on-the-job training measures than 
correctly allocated workers. For undereducated workers, the reverse is the case. 
These results hold when controlling for several socio-economic characteristics (Table 
6, Models I and III) as well as for job characteristics (Models II and IV).  
 
---- Please insert Table 6 about here ---- 
 
Some authors, such as Hersch (1995), argue that the finding that overeducated 
workers receive less training than correctly allocated ones is in line with theoretical 
expectations, and contend that the overeducated simply need less initial training to 
perform their job on account of their higher productivity. However, this contradicts 
the unchallenged empirical evidence that on-the-job training is a complementary, 
rather than a substitutive, element of human capital. This means that employers tend 
to select the most productive workers for training measures; a selection mechanism 
that was observed by Gerlach and Jirjahn (1998), for example, in analyses of firm 
data. Since overeducated workers are less productive, it is not surprising that they 
report less access to training opportunities than correctly allocated workers. On the 
contrary, this result is to be expected.  
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5. Conclusions 
The central finding of the present analysis is that overeducated workers have worse 
career prospects than correctly allocated workers. This is in clear contrast to the 
results put forward by Sicherman (1991). Note, however, that we were able to 
replicate the US results with our German data when using Sicherman’s approach. 
Therefore, the key to understanding the puzzling pattern of results is to be found in a 
discussion of the validity of the indicators chosen to indicate upward career mobility, 
and the quality of specification in Sicherman’s model. 
In this respect, we believe that a move from an occupation with low demands 
in terms of human capital investment to one with higher requirements is not a 
satisfying indicator for upward mobility. First of all, this would not cover the 
majority of career moves, which are to be observed within specific professions. This 
holds especially when aggregating occupations within large groups, as done by 
Sicherman. How often will it be possible to observe a move from Sicherman’s 
category of “judges, lawyers” (ranking position 2) to that of “physicians, dentists” 
(ranking position 1)?  
For West Germany, we found that most changes are realized between groups 
with low human capital stock. It is essential to control for the fact that most mobility 
occurs in the lower categories. Failing to control for this base effect will lead to 
severe misinterpretation of the findings, as our results show. The problems with 
categorization of groups disappear when using the metric scaled variable “relative 
wage change”; the problem with ceiling effects at the upper end of distribution 
remains. It is trivial to state that promotion is easier to realize when starting from a 
lower point in the hierarchy (where most of the overeducated are to be found) than 
from a higher one. However, this is not the question to be analysed: The question is 
whether qualification mismatch per se has an impact on career prospects. It is thus 
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essential to control for the starting situation in these model types, regardless of the 
construction of the dependent variable indicating upward career mobility. 
 The first overall conclusion to be drawn from our findings is that moves 
between occupations with different human capital requirements are not very valid 
indicators for career mobility in a vertical sense. Relative wage change is a better 
indicator, producing much more plausible results. Second, when analysing upward 
mobility, it is important to control for the starting position. If this step is omitted, 
results tend to be influenced by the simple ceiling effect that people starting from a 
very low position have better chances of upward mobility than those with a higher 
position. This effect has nothing to do with qualification mismatches. Because 
overeducated (undereducated) workers tend to have jobs with lower (higher) 
requirements than correctly allocated workers, this ceiling effect is at least partly 
attributable to the mismatch covariates. Therefore, results can be seriously 
misleading if these effects are not controlled for. Only when using wage growth as an 
indicator for upward career mobility and controlling for starting wages do we find 
what we really expect: Less successful people who work in jobs for which they are 
overeducated continue to be less successful in their careers than correctly allocated 
workers, while the opposite is true of undereducated persons.  
With respect to the overeducated, these findings are in line with the findings 
of Büchel and Pollmann-Schult (2001), who have shown that overeducated workers 
have significantly lower school achievements than correctly allocated workers with 
the same level of formal qualification. This is, by the way, an alternative explanation 
for the occurrence of overeducation that is conceded by Sicherman himself (1991, p. 
103). Viewed in this light, overeducated workers lack necessary skills that cannot be 
substituted by the signalling effect of their certificates. Compared with other job 
applicants with the same level of formal qualification, they are allocated to a lower 
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position in Thurow’s (1975) job queue. At first glance and relative to other workers, 
these overeducated workers with low skills show similar characteristics as the 
overeducated job-starters in the career mobility model: less work experience 
(because of a higher unemployment risk) and lower levels of firm tenure (because 
they tend to work in peripheral labour markets with instable jobs). The simple 
attribution of these characteristics to overeducation therefore cannot be taken as 
proof of the explanatory power of the career mobility theory in the context of 
overeducation. On the contrary, our overall results indicate that the career mobility 
model, though theoretically and intuitively intriguing, cannot explain the widespread 
persistence of overeducation in industrialized countries. 
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Tables 
 
Table 1 Overeducation, Undereducation, and Upward Mobility in West Germany 
Descriptive Statistics 
 
  Correctly 
allocated 
 
Overeducat
ed 
Undereducated (All) 
A) 
Move to higher-
ranked occupationa 
 
No 
 
15989 
(96.3%) 
 
2532 
(95.5%) 
 
393 
(94.0%) 
 
18914 
(96.2%) 
 
 Yes 610 
(3.7%) 
119 
(4.5%) 
25 
(6.0%) 
 
754 
(3.8%) 
 
  16599 
(100%) 
 
2651 
(100%) 
418 
(100%) 
 
19668 
(100%) 
B) 
1-Year Wage 
growth >  
(mean + standard 
deviation)b 
 
No 
 
14154 
(89.1%) 
 
 
2277 
(88.3%) 
 
324 
(85.4%) 
 
16755 
(89.0%) 
 
 Yes 1746 
(10.9%) 
 
300 
(11.7%) 
60 
(14.6%) 
2106 
(11.0%) 
 
 
 15900 
(100%) 
2577 
(100%) 
384 
(100%) 
18861 
(100%) 
 
 
Note: Frequencies are calculated for each column.  
a Only workers with valid data for the occupation variable in two consecutive years are included. The highest 
occupational group in the base year was excluded because, by definition, this group cannot achieve further 
upward mobility. 
b Only workers with valid data for the wage variable in two consecutive years are included. Extreme values were 
excluded (below DM 1,000 per month and above DM 15,000 per month gross earnings). To allow for the 
possibility of upward mobility among all respondents, those with wages above DM 10,000 per month in the base 
period were also excluded. Means and standard deviations are calculated separately for blue- and white-collar 
workers by year. 
The sample includes male workers who were below the age of 65 in 1997. Only West Germans and foreigners 
who were educated and trained in West Germany are included. Only full-time blue- and white-collar workers. 
The self-employed, trainees, and civil servants are not included. 
Source: Own calculations based on data from the 1984-1997 waves of the German Socio-Economic Panel 
(GSOEP). 
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Table 2 Overeducation, Undereducation and Upward Occupational Mobility  
Dependent variable = 1 if moved to a higher-ranked occupation  
 
 
 United States 
(Sicherman 1991)
West Germany  
 Ia IIa IIIb IVb,c Vb,c 
Intercept -0.3157 -2.3713** -1.3856** -1.9171** -2.2226** 
 (-1.2) (0.2617) (0.1173) (0.1528) (0.1934) 
Schooling -0.0676** -0.0031 -0.0008 0.0015 0.0835** 
 (-4.2) (0.0179) (0.0080) (0.0083) (0.0128) 
Experience -0.0536** -0.0614** -0.0284** -0.0255** -0.0303** 
 (-3.8) (0.0167) (0.0075) (0.0083) (0.0096) 
Experience2 0.0000 0.0010** 0.0005** 0.0004* 0.0005** 
 (1.6) (0.0004) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) 
Union member 0.2050 -0.0805 -0.0339 -0.0412 -0.0642 
 (2.4) (0.0838) (0.0369) (0.0389) (0.0450) 
Foreigner 0.1076 -0.0677 -0.0313 -0.0316 -0.1240* 
 (1.2) (0.0851) (0.0379) (0.0396) (0.0491) 
Large city -0.0949 0.0034 0.0013 0.0134 -0.0021 
 (-1.1) (0.0807) (0.0359) (0.0372) (0.0441) 
Married -0.1631 -0.0558 -0.0234 -0.0235 -0.0204 
 (-1.5) (0.0954) (0.0429) (0.0445) (0.0513) 
Disabled -0.1091 -0.4445** -0.1918** -0.3172** -0.3661** 
 (-0.67) (0.1370) (0.0578) (0.0593) (0.0660) 
Overeducated 0.2181* 0.2315* 0.0978* 0.1173* -0.0900 
 (2.5) (0.1038) (0.0471) (0.0491) (0.0600) 
Undereducated 0.3103** 0.5332* 0.2460* 0.2406* 0.5669** 
 (2.6) (0.2117) (0.0999) (0.1043) (0.1282) 
Occupations ranked 2-8 . . . . -1.6352** 
     (0.1270) 
Occupations ranked 9-13 . . . . -0.6388** 
     (0.0820) 
Occupations ranked 14-18 . . . . -0.6950** 
     (0.0860) 
Occupations ranked 19-24 . . . . -0.7359** 
     (0.0593) 
Base group: ranks 25-27 . . . .  
Tenure, firm size, and 
industry dummies   
NO NO NO YES YES 
LR or Wald Chi2 . 62.48** 62.41** 326.43** 456.04** 
Observations 5064 19668 
Groups  . 2931 
Note: ** indicates significance at the 1% level and * at the 5% level. All regressors are measured in the base 
period. a Logit regressions; asymptotic t-statistics in parentheses. Upward moves between 1976-1977 and 1978-
1979. b Random effects probits; standard errors in parentheses. The highest occupational group in the base year 
was excluded because its members cannot achieve further upward mobility. c Tenure, firm size, and industry 
dummies included and not reported.  
The sample includes male workers who were below the age of 65 in 1997. Only West Germans and foreigners 
who were educated and trained in West Germany are included. Only full-time blue- and white-collar workers. 
The self-employed, trainees, and civil servants are not included. 
Source: a PSID: Sicherman (1991), Table 3, column (c). b Own calculations based on data from waves 1984-1997 
of the German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP). 
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Table 3 Overeducation, Undereducation and One-Year Upward Wage Mobility  
 
 West Germany 
 Dependent variable = 1 if wage 
growth > mean+stand. deviationa
 
Dependent variable = 
wage growthb 
 I II c III IV c 
Intercept -0.9127** -0.8596** 0.0655** 0.0641** 
 (0.1073) (0.1228) (0.0090) (0.0105) 
Schooling 0.0733** 0.0747** 0.0124** 0.0124** 
 (0.0087) (0.0088) (0.0007) (0.0007) 
Experience -0.0094 -0.0004 -0.0017** -0.0008 
 (0.0065) (0.0069) (0.0006) (0.0006) 
Experience2/10 0.001 -0.0001 0.0003** 0.0000 
 (0.001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0000) 
Union member 0.0372 0.0491 0.0054* 0.0051* 
 (0.0310) (0.0315) (0.0026) (0.0026) 
Foreigner -0.0083 -0.0126 -0.0142** -0.0139** 
 (0.0332) (0.0335) (0.0028) (0.0028) 
Large city 0.0127 0.0097 -0.0002 -0.0005 
 (0.0313) (0.0314) (0.0026) (0.0026) 
Married 0.0203 0.0205 0.0101** 0.0101** 
 (0.0366) (0.0366) (0.0031) (0.0031) 
Disabled -0.1038* -0.1090** -0.0040 -0.0056 
 (0.0413) (0.0422) (0.0035) (0.0036) 
Overeducated -0.1440** -0.1591** -0.0253** -0.0271** 
 (0.0426) (0.0429) (0.0036) (0.0036) 
Undereducated 0.5099** 0.5006** 0.0458** 0.0453** 
 (0.0949) (0.0951) (0.0085) (0.0085) 
Base year wage (gross  -0.2762** -0.2859** -0.0352** 0.0366** 
monthly)/1000 (0.0157) (0.0160) (0.0010) (0.0010) 
Tenure, firm size, and 
industry dummies 
NO YES NO YES 
Chi2 / F Chi2=442.13** Chi2=476.42** Chi2=1375** Chi2=1467.13** 
Observations 18861 18861 
Groups 2974 2974 
Note: ** indicates significance at the 1% level and * at the 5% level. All regressors are measured in the base 
period. Random effects probits; standard errors in parentheses. Extreme values were excluded (below DM 1,000 
per month and above DM 15,000 per month). To allow for the possibility of upward mobility among all 
respondents, those with wages above DM 10,000 per month in the base period were also excluded. Means and 
standard deviations of wage change are calculated separately for blue- and white-collar workers by year.  
a Random effects probit; dependent variable=1 if: ∆ ln (wi,g,y) > mean (∆ ln (wg,y)) + std (∆ ln (wg,y)), where I 
= individuals, g = seven occupational position groups and y = pair of years. 
b Random effects GLS; dependent variable is wage growth: ln(wt+1) - ln(wt). 
c Tenure, firm size, and industry dummies included and not reported.  
The sample includes male workers who were below the age of 65 in 1997. Only West Germans and foreigners 
who were educated and trained in West Germany are included. Only full-time blue- and white-collar workers. 
The self-employed, trainees, and civil servants are not included. 
Source: Own calculations based on data from the 1984-1997 waves of the German Socio-Economic Panel 
(GSOEP). 
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Table 4 Overeducation, Undereducation and Five-Year Upward Wage Mobility  
 
 West Germany 
 Dependent variable = 1 if wage 
growth > mean+stand. deviationa
 
Dependent variable = 
wage growthb 
 I IIc III IVc 
Intercept -0.5313* -0.3875 0.2091** 0.2155** 
 (0.2425) (0.2665) (0.0241) (0.0255) 
Schooling 0.1784** 0.1768** 0.0452** 0.0445** 
 (0.0207) (0.0210) (0.0019) (0.0019) 
Experience -0.0434** -0.0392* -0.0016 -0.0012 
 (0.0151) (0.0161) (0.0013) (0.0014) 
Experience2/10 0.0005 0.0003 0.0001* 0.0000 
 (0.0003) (0.0004) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
Union member 0.0291 0.0371 0.0158** 0.0142** 
 (0.0644) (0.0660) (0.0053) (0.0054) 
Foreigner -0.1680* -0.1484 -0.0557** -0.0509** 
 (0.0775) (0.0787) (0.0078) (0.0079) 
Large city 0.0574 0.0560 0.0024 0.0021 
 (0.0712) (0.0719) (0.0070) (0.0070) 
Married -0.0115 -0.0045 -0.0029 -0.0022 
 (0.0748) (0.0756) (0.0069) (0.0069) 
Disabled -0.0696 -0.0900 0.0254** 0.0193** 
 (0.0640) (0.0665) (0.0048) (0.0050) 
Overeducated -0.2245** -0.2185* -0.0448** -0.0442** 
 (0.0875) (0.0887) (0.0080) (0.0080) 
Undereducated 0.7286** 0.7294** 0.1311** 0.1309** 
 (0.2226) (0.2247) (0.0197) (0.0197) 
Base year wage (gross  -0.0007** -0.0007** -0.0001** -0.0001** 
monthly)/1000 (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
Tenure, firm size and 
industry dummies 
NO YES NO YES 
Chi2 / F Chi2=474.19** Chi2=478.63** Chi2=3517.43** Chi2=3591.69** 
Observations 9689 9689 
Groups 1924 1924 
Note: ** indicates significance at the 1% level and * at the 5% level. All regressors are measured in the base 
period. Random effects probits; standard errors in parentheses. Extreme values were excluded (below DM 1,000 
per month and above DM 15,000 per month). To allow for the possibility of upward mobility among all workers, 
those with wages above DM 10,000 per month in the base period were also excluded. Mean and standard 
deviation of wage change are calculated separately for blue- and white-collar workers by year.  
a Random effects probit; dependent variable=1 if: ∆ ln (wi,g,y) > mean (∆ ln (wg,y)) + std (∆ ln (wg,y)), where I 
= individuals, g = seven occupational position groups and y = five-year interval. 
b Random effects GLS; dependent variable is wage growth: ln(wt+5) - ln(wt).  
c Tenure, firm size, and industry dummies included and not reported. 
The sample includes male workers who were below the age of 65 in 1997. Only West Germans and foreigners 
who were educated and trained in West Germany are included. Only full-time blue- and white-collar workers. 
The self-employed, trainees, and civil servants are not included. 
Source: Own calculations based on data from the 1984-1997 waves of the German Socio-Economic Panel 
(GSOEP). 
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Table 5 Learning On-the-Job and Formal Training: Tests for Robustness  
(Descriptive Statistics) 
 
  Correctly 
Allocated 
 
Overeducated Undereducated (All) 
Do you feel that, 
when doing your 
No/ 
partly 
3733 
(82.06%) 
752 
(16.53%) 
64 
(1.41%) 
4549 
(70.10%)
job, you are always 
learning things that 
could lead to a 
better job or 
promotion?a 
Yes 
 
1732 
(31.69) 
137 
(15.41) 
71 
(52.59) 
1940 
(29.90%)
  5465 
(100%) 
 
889 
(100%) 
135 
(100%) 
6489 
(100%) 
Have you   
participated in any 
vocational training 
No/ 
partly 
1759 
(80.10%) 
334 
(92.78%) 
28 
(51.85%) 
2121 
(81.26%)
during the past 
three years?b  
Yes 437 
(19.90%) 
 
26 
(7.22%) 
26 
(48.15%) 
489 
(18.74%)
 
 
 
 2196 
(100%) 
360 
(100%) 
54 
(100%) 
2610 
(100%) 
Note: Frequencies are calculated for each column and are weighted by the sample weight.  
a Years: 1985, 1987, 1989, 1997.  
b Years: 1989, 1993; only training lasting more than one day is considered in the “yes” category. 
The sample includes male workers who were below the age of 65 in 1997. Only West Germans and foreigners 
who were educated and trained in West Germany are included. Only full-time blue- and white-collar workers. 
The self-employed, trainees, and civil servants are not included. 
Source: Own calculations based on data from the 1984-1997 waves of the German Socio-Economic Panel 
(GSOEP). 
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Table 6 Learning On-the-Job and Formal Training: Tests for Robustness 
  (Results from Models) 
 
 West Germany 
 Dependent variable=1 if worker 
feels that he is always learning 
things on the job that are 
helpful for further promotion 
Dependent variable=1 if worker 
received at least two days of 
formal training over the past 
three years 
 Ia IIa,c IIIb IVb,c 
Intercept -1.6566** -1.9852** -3.3174** -2.8683** 
 
 
(0.2010) (0.2490) (0.3843) (0.4261) 
Schooling 0.1422** 0.1453** 0.1990** 0.1650** 
 
 
(0.0144) (0.0145) (0.0234) (0.0234) 
Experience -0.0276* -0.0174 0.0268 0.0361 
 
 
(0.0117) (0.0124) (0.0238) (0.0252) 
Experience2 0.0002 0.0001 -0.0011* -0.0014** 
 
 
(0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0005) (0.0005) 
Union member -0.0272 0.0119 0.0850 -0.0386 
 
 
(0.0558) (0.0569) (0.1010) (0.1061) 
Foreigner -0.4866** -0.4854** -1.3186** -1.2622** 
 
 
(0.0658) (0.0665) (0.1498) (0.1498) 
Large city 0.0701 0.0611 0.2683** 0.2467* 
 
 
(0.0596) (0.0598) (0.1009) (0.1016) 
Married 0.1004 0.1032 0.2237+ 0.2529* 
 
 
(0.0689) (0.0692) (0.1254) (0.1257) 
Disabled -0.0204 -0.0435 -0.1085 -0.0882 
 
 
(0.0440) (0.0484) (0.2075) (0.2082) 
Overeducated -0.7152** -0.7260** -0.7988** -0.8356** 
 
 
(0.0839) (0.0842) (0.1681) (0.1690) 
Undereducated 0.4741** 0.4981** 0.8912** 0.8041** 
 
 
(0.1570) (0.1577) (0.2628) (0.2600) 
Tenure, firm size, and 
industry dummies 
NO YES NO YES 
Chi2 345.16** 387.41** 192.17** 206.59** 
Observations 6489 2610 
Groups 2238 1305 
 
Note: Random effects probits; standard errors in parentheses: ** indicates significance at the 1% level, * at the 
5% level and + at the 10% level.  
a Pooled waves 1985, 1987, 1989, 1997 of GSOEP.  
b Pooled waves 1989, 1993 of GSOEP.  
c Tenure, firm size, and industry dummies included and not reported. 
The sample includes male workers who were below the age of 65 in 1997. Only West Germans and foreigners 
who were educated and trained in West Germany are included. Only full-time blue- and white-collar workers. 
The self-employed, trainees, and civil servants are not included. 
Source: Own calculations based on data from the German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP). 
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Appendix Tables 
 
Table A1 Categorization of Over- and Undereducation 
 
Formal Qualification 
of Jobholder 
No Degree Vocational 
Training 
Degree 
Academic 
Degree 
 
 
 
 
 
Job Requirements 
 
 
 
 
 
Occupational Position of Jobholder Mismatch Status 
Unskilled or Semi-Skilled Blue Collar correct over over 
Skilled Blue Collar - ? - 
Unskilled White Collar correct over over 
Skilled White Collar - ? ? 
No Training or Just Short 
Introduction to the New Job 
Required 
Professional or Managerial White Collar - - - 
Unskilled or Semi-Skilled Blue Collar correct over over 
Skilled Blue Collar correct ? - 
Unskilled White Collar correct over over 
Skilled White Collar under ? ? 
Longer Firm-Specific 
Settling-In Period Required 
Professional or Managerial White Collar under ? ? 
Unskilled or Semi-Skilled Blue Collar correct ? over 
Skilled Blue Collar correct correct over 
Unskilled White Collar correct correct over 
Skilled White Collar under correct over 
Vocational Training Degree 
or Special Courses Required 
Professional or Managerial White Collar under correct correct 
Unskilled or Semi-Skilled Blue Collar - - - 
Skilled Blue Collar - - - 
Unskilled White Collar - - - 
Skilled White Collar - - ? 
Academic Degree Required 
Professional or Managerial White Collar under under correct 
 
Legend: 
correct: Correctly allocated 
over: Overeducated 
under: Undereducated 
?: Unclear mismatch status (about 5%) 
-: Implausible combination of mismatch-generating variables (< 1%) 
 
Note: System applies to West Germany only. The self-employed and civil servants are excluded. 
Source: Own extension of the Büchel and Weißhuhn (1997) concept. 
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Table A2 Means and Frequencies for All Specifications 
 
 
 Move to 
Higher-
Ranked 
Occupation 
 
Upward Wage 
Mobility 
Continuous variables:  
Means (standard deviations) 
  
Schooling in years 10.9 (2.3) 10.9 (2.2) 
   
Experience in years 22.3 (10.6) 22.1(10.6) 
   
Dependent variable . 0.04 (0.16) a 
 
Dummy variables:  
Frequencies 
  
Dependent variable 3.8 11.2 b 
Union 31.8 32.0 
Non-German 35.1 35.5 
City 32.3 32.7 
Spouse 75.9 75.2 
Disabled 12.2 12.3 
Overeducated 13.5 13.7 
Undereducated 2.1 2.0 
Tenure ≤ 1 year 7.3 7.5 
1 < tenure ≤ 5 years 22.0 21.0 
5 < tenure ≤ 10 years 20.9 22.4 
10 < tenure ≤ 20 years 31.1 30.7 
Tenure > 20 years 18.7 18.4 
Firm size < 20 7.7 13.3 
20 < Firm size ≤ 200 12.5 12.2 
Firm size > 200 25.9 20.5 
Firm size missing 53.9 54.0 
Agriculture, forestry, and fisheries 0.4 0.3 
Energy and mining 1.3 1.1 
Manufacturing 22.4 22.5 
Construction 5.8 5.4 
Trade 2.6 2.8 
Traffic and communication 2.1 2.1 
Credit and insurance 1.3 1.3 
Other services 2.9 2.9 
State and social security 1.9 1.9 
Non-profit 0.4 0.4 
Industry missing 48.9 48.8 
 
Note: a Models III and IV in Table 4. b Models I and II in Table 4. 
 
The sample includes male workers who were below the age of 65 in 1997. Only West Germans and foreigners 
who were educated and trained in West Germany are included. Only full-time blue- and white-collar workers. 
The self-employed, trainees, and civil servants are not included. 
  
Source: Own calculations based on data from the 1984-1997 waves of the German Socio-Economic Panel 
(GSOEP). 
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Endnotes: 
 
                                                          
1 See Sicherman and Galor (1990), pages 169 and 177.  
2 For an overview of these and many more, see Rumberger (1981) or Büchel (2001). 
3 Note, however, the contrasting findings when comparing persons working in jobs with similar requirements 
rather than persons with similar formal qualifications (Büchel forthcoming). 
4 Information on disability was not collected in the 1990 or 1993 waves of the GSOEP. Union status was only 
surveyed in years 1985, 1989, 1989, and 1993. We thus use data from the last available year for both of these 
variables. This should not cause major problems as both variables show only minor variation over time. 
5 In the earnings analysis, we exclude persons with gross monthly earnings of above DM 10,000 in the base year. 
A very few outliers with earnings below DM 1,000 or above DM 15,000 in any year of observation are also 
excluded. 
6 A list of covariates and results of this preliminary step are available from the authors on request. 
7 Because this data was collected using the ISCO in the GSOEP, some groups are not directly comparable to 
Sicherman’s groups, e.g., the group “other craftsmen” is split up into several groups in Germany. Moreover, the 
group “public advisor” does not exist in Germany and self-employed workers are not included in the analyses. 
Results of this step are available from the authors on request. 
8 See Appendix Table A2 for on overview of the means and frequencies of all variables included in the analysis.  
9 Upward move frequencies are not reported in the tables. 
10 This is similar to the approach taken by Robst (1995), who found that controlling for required schooling leads 
to insignificant parameter estimates of the overeducation variable. 
11 The 1995 data for West Germany, for example, show that 89% of all overeducated respondents work in jobs 
that require no skills at all (Büchel forthcoming). 
12 The groups follow workers’ status position as described in the previous section, with the exception that 
managerial and professional white-collar workers were aggregated into a single group on account of the 
relatively small number of observations per year. For each of the 91 groups, the means and standard deviations 
of wage growth were then estimated per year. 
13 This result is in line with that reported by Robst (1995: Table 6, column 1). 
